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Abstract 
This  paper  presents  novel  empirical  evidence  on  key  predictions  of  heterogeneous  firm 
models  by  examining  stock  market  reactions  to  the  Canada-United  States  Free  Trade 
Agreement  of  1989  (CUSFTA).  Using  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  agreement’s 
ratification, I show that the pattern of abnormal returns of Canadian manufacturing …firms 
was broadly consistent with the predictions of a class of models based on Melitz (2003). 
Increases in the likelihood of ratification led to stock market gains of exporting firms relative 
to non-exporters. Moreover, gains were higher in sectors with  larger cuts in U.S. import 
tariffs.  Decreases  in  the  likelihood  of  ratification  led  to  opposite  stock  market  reactions. 
Results  for  the  impact  of  Canadian  tariff  reductions  are  less  conclusive  but  most 
specifications suggest that exporters also gained relative to non-exporters in response to such 
reductions. Translating stock market gains into implied profit changes, I find that CUSFTA 
increased expected per-period profits of exporters by around 6-7% relative to non-exporters. 
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 H. Breinlich, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a revolution in the theoretical analysis of trade liberalization episodes.
Since the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003), models with heterogeneous ￿rms have all but
replaced traditional modelling approaches with homogeneous ￿rms. The key innovation of Melitz
and subsequent extensions was to show how trade liberalization leads to aggregate productivity
gains through intra-industry reallocation.1 The mechanism underlying this reallocation is the
di⁄erential impact of trade liberalization on exporting and non-exporting ￿rms. While exporters
bene￿t from increased access to foreign markets, non-exporters su⁄er lower pro￿ts due to increased
product and factor market competition. Together with the assumption that exporters are more
productive than non-exporters, the ensuing reallocation of market shares towards exporting ￿rms
raises aggregate productivity.
Many features of heterogeneous ￿rm models are consistent with stylized facts which have
emerged from a large empirical literature over the years. For example, Bernard and Jensen (1999)
provide evidence that more productive ￿rms self-select into export markets. Tybout (2003) sum-
marizes several studies which show that market share reallocations were an important part of trade
liberalization episodes. A smaller literature also provides more direct evidence on the impact of
lower trade costs on the reallocation of market shares between exporters and non-exporters (e.g.,
Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006; Tre￿ er, 2004).
A common feature of all empirical studies to date is their ex-post character. That is, they track
the ￿rm- or sector-level variables of interest for a number of years and try to isolate the impact of
trade policy changes from a large number of confounding factors. Depending on the speci￿c setting
of the liberalization episode, this can pose considerable econometric challenges (see, for example,
Tre￿ er, 2004).
In this paper, I take a di⁄erent approach to providing evidence for the di⁄erential impact of trade
liberalization across ￿rms. I do so by using stock market reactions surrounding the implementation
process of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (henceforth, CUSFTA). Under
the assumption that unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation are
su¢ ciently rapidly re￿ ected in stock prices, price reactions contain information about changes in
future pro￿ts and can be used to implement a test of heterogeneous ￿rm models.2
One advantage of such an event study approach over traditional ex-post evaluations is that the
number of confounding factors is much more limited. Only factors about which expectations change
during my one- to two-day event windows will have the potential to contaminate the estimates.
Secondly, an event study approach arguably presents a more direct test of heterogenous ￿rm models.
These models essentially make predictions about changes in future per-period pro￿ts brought about
1See, for example, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Chaney (2008). An alternative approach developed by Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Bernard et al. (2003) yields very similar predictions about the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
2As I discuss in detail below, the main results of this paper do not require stock markets to be e¢ cient in the
sense of immediately re￿ ecting all available information, but only that new events are priced in within a period of
one or two days to a statistically detectable extent.
2by trade liberalizations. To the extent that expectations about these changes will be re￿ ected
in stock prices, analyzing price reactions will be conceptually closer to the models￿theoretical
predictions than looking at realized ￿rm-level variables ex-post.
CUSFTA is particularly well suited for providing event study evidence on heterogeneous ￿rm
models. In particular, the agreement was the main election issue in the Canadian general election
of November 1988. Both the election itself as well as a number of events in its run-up provide
unanticipated changes in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation which can be usefully ex-
ploited in an event study. Secondly, CUSFTA was a reciprocal agreement and is as such suitable
for analyzing the di⁄erential impact of domestic and foreign tari⁄s. This distinction is a key ele-
ment of many of the more recent heterogeneous ￿rm models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or
Chaney (2008). Finally, the large variation of tari⁄ cuts across sectors allows the implementation
of a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences estimation strategy within the event study framework.
My ￿ndings are broadly supportive of the predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models. The election
victory of the ruling Progressive Conservatives (a strong supporter of CUSFTA) led to signi￿cant
stock market gains of exporting ￿rms relative to non-exporting ￿rms. In contrast, opinion polls
in the run-up to the election showing a substantial lead for the oppositional Liberal Party (who
were opposed to CUSFTA) resulted in negative abnormal returns of exporters compared to non-
exporters.
In order to address the possibility that a Conservative election victory may have a⁄ected these
two groups of ￿rms di⁄erently through channels other than CUSFTA, I compare return di⁄erences
between exporters and non-exporters across industries with di⁄erent extents of tari⁄ cuts. Consis-
tent with theoretical predictions, I ￿nd that the relative gains and losses of exporters were indeed
signi￿cantly higher in sectors with larger U.S. tari⁄ cuts. These results are robust to including a
number of control variables such as changes in intermediate input tari⁄s and ￿rms￿multinational
status.
As a further check on my results, I also examine stock market reactions to two earlier events
which were directly related to CUSFTA but not the election itself: the reaching of an agreement
on CUSFTA after di¢ cult negotiations between the U.S. and Canada in October 1987; and the
refusal of the Canadian Senate to ratify the agreement in July 1988. I again ￿nd that stock prices of
exporters increased relative to those of non-exporters in reaction to the ￿rst event, and decreased in
response to the second event. As before, reactions were stronger in sectors with higher future U.S.
tari⁄ cuts. Finally, I also perform placebo checks by looking at stock market reactions on dates on
which no new information about CUSFTA was revealed. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I
do not ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects in these additional regressions.
My results are less conclusive with respect to the e⁄ects of Canadian tari⁄ cuts. The majority
of results suggests that exporting ￿rms also gained relative to non-exporting ￿rms in response to
such tari⁄ reductions. However, the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates are generally small and
have the wrong sign for some speci￿cations and events. Interestingly, as I discuss below, these
weaker results correspond to less clear-cut theoretical predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models
3with respect to import tari⁄ liberalization (as opposed to export tari⁄ reductions), in the sense
that the predictions of existing models seem to partially depend on speci￿c assumptions about
demand and cost structures.
To evaluate the quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated return di⁄erences, I
also calculate the CUSFTA-induced change in the expected future pro￿ts of active ￿rms implied
by my estimates. Based on assumptions about the change in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s imple-
mentation brought about by the Conservative election victory, I estimate that CUSFTA increased
exporters￿ per-period pro￿ts by around 6%-7% relative to non-exporters in the most plausible
scenarios, and up to 14% under more extreme assumptions.
While stock market event studies are frequently employed in the corporate ￿nance literature,
they have rarely been used to test theories of international trade. Exceptions include Grossman and
Levinsohn (1989), who use stock market returns to provide evidence in favor of the speci￿c-factor
model of trade, and a small number of papers which analyze stock market reactions to trade policy
announcements concerning speci￿c industries, such as the imposition of antidumping duties (e.g.,
Hartigan et al., 1986 and 1989; Hughes et al., 1997). To the best of my knowledge, the present
paper is the ￿rst to analyze stock market reactions to a broad-based trade liberalization episode
and link the results to recent theories of international trade. While my focus is on testing models of
heterogeneous ￿rms, some of my robustness checks also provide complementary evidence to existing
results from ex-post approaches for the e⁄ect of reductions in intermediate input tari⁄s and the
di⁄erential impact of trade liberalization on multinational and domestic ￿rms. The use of cross-
sectional variation in tari⁄ cuts to implement a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach within the event
study framework is also novel and substantially increases the potential for convincing econometric
identi￿cation. Finally, the present paper seems to be the ￿rst to attempt a quanti￿cation of the
di⁄erential impact of trade liberalizations on the pro￿ts of ￿rms within an industry, which is the
driving force behind subsequent market share reallocations.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how stock price reactions can
be used to test heterogeneous ￿rm models, and uses a simple model of this class to derive testable
predictions for the remaining sections. Section 3 describes CUSFTA and the speci￿c events I study
in more detail. Section 4 discusses the event study methodology and describes the data sources
used. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
This section demonstrates the link between the predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models and stock
market reactions to expected changes in trade costs, and derives testable predictions for the sub-
sequent analysis. In a ￿rst step, I discuss how stock market prices are linked to ￿rm-level pro￿ts
and what assumptions are needed for my approach (Section 2.1). I then discuss the predictions of
heterogeneous ￿rm models with respect to how pro￿ts change in response to reductions in domestic
and foreign tari⁄s. In Section 2.2, I focus on a heterogeneous ￿rm model based on Chaney (2008)
4which is simple enough to clearly demonstrate the key mechanisms at work, yet su¢ ciently ￿ exible
to accomodate asymmetric countries and tari⁄ barriers, two key features CUSFTA. Section 2.3
discusses to what extent the insights from this model carry over to more general settings, and Ap-
pendix A presents analytical results for two popular extensions of Melitz (2003), the original Chaney
(2008) model and the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), both of which allow for asymmetric
countries and tari⁄ barriers, while still delivering closed-form solutions for relative pro￿t changes.
2.1 Linking stock prices to expected pro￿ts
The standard approach to linking stock prices and expected pro￿ts is the dividend discount model
(see Brealey and Myers, 2000). The dividend discount model states that the price of ￿rm i0s shares





(1 + ei)s =
E(DIVijIt)
ei
where E(DIVijIt) is the expected value of future per-period dividends per share of ￿rm i, given
information available on date t (It), and ei is the expected return on securities in the same risk
class as ￿rm i. Assuming that ￿rms disburse all pro￿ts as dividends, or that pro￿ts are reinvested
at an internal rate of return equal to ei, share prices are simply the net present value of expected









Now consider any two ￿rms, e.g., an exporter (X) and a non-exporter (NX). The di⁄erence in stock
market returns between these two ￿rms upon the arrival of new information at time t + " will be
(assuming ei stays constant for both groups):







What matters for the di⁄erence in stock market returns is thus the change in expected future
pro￿ts of exporters relative to non-exporters upon the arrival of new information (regarding the
likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation in the present case). Since models of heterogeneous ￿rms
make explicit predictions about these pro￿t changes, stock market returns can be used to implement
empirical tests of this class of models.
Note that for testing the qualitative predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models, the assumptions
underlying the above derivations can be substantially relaxed. For example, one could easily allow
for more complex connections between dividends and pro￿ts, as long as the positive correlation
between changes in both variables is preserved. Likewise, it is not required that stock prices fully
3It is straightforward to allow for growth in expected dividends or positive net present value projects (see Brealey
and Myers, 2000). Since this would not add any new insights for the purpose of this paper, I abstract from such
complications.
5and immediately re￿ ect all relevant information. All that is needed is that new information about
the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation is priced in to a statistically detectable extent within
a period of one or two days (which will be the standard length of my event windows).4 Given the
importance of CUSFTA in the Canadian election campaign of 1988 and for the Canadian economy
more generally, it seems reasonable that at least some market participants reacted quickly to the
Progressive Conservatives￿election victory and were able to judge CUSFTA￿ s impact on ￿rm pro￿ts,
at least in terms of the direction of the change if not its exact magnitude.5
2.2 Firm-Level Pro￿ts and Trade Liberalization
I now turn to a discussion of how pro￿t changes after trade liberalization vary across di⁄erent types
of ￿rms in models with heterogeneous ￿rms. I use a version of Chaney (2008) to illustrate the main
points and discuss to what extent these results carry over to alternative heterogenous ￿rm models
in the next section.
Consider a setting with N potentially asymmetric countries. A representative consumer in each
country derives utility from the consumption of goods from S + 1 sectors. The ￿rst S sectors













where ￿sn presents the set of available varieties of good Qns in country n, which will be endogenously
determined, and ￿s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in sector s.





;where pns(￿) is the price of
variety ￿ in sector s, country n. Good A is freely traded and I choose its price as the numeraire.
With this setup, expenditure per consumer on Qns is ￿xed at Ens = PnsQns = ￿ns and demand
for individual varieties is qns(￿) = pns (￿)
￿￿s P￿s￿1
ns ￿ns.
I choose parameter values such that all countries produce positive amounts of the numeraire.
Labor is mobile between sectors, and the numeraire sector operates under perfect competition
and with linear production function An = lAn￿An, where ￿An is labor productivity and lAn labor
employed in the numeraire sector in country n. Pro￿t maximization implies that wages in country
n are equal to labor productivity, wn = ￿An.
The di⁄erentiated goods are produced using labor as the only factor of production. Firms vary
in productivity levels, ￿, and have unit labor requirements of l(￿) = q=￿. In order to ship goods
from country i to country j, ￿rms further incur variable trade costs ￿s
ij of the standard iceberg
4In this sense, the general critique that stock market event studies always present a joint test of both the theory
in question and the e¢ cient market hypothesis (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997) only applies to a lesser extent to the
present paper.
5Market e¢ ciency, rational expectations of market participants, and the exact link between dividends and pro￿ts
do become important, however, when I try to quantify the pro￿t impact of tari⁄ changes in Section 5.3. For this, I
will need expression (1) to hold exactly.
6type. Finally, a ￿rm in country i selling goods to country j in sector s has to pay a ￿xed cost of
fs
ij in terms of the numeraire.
Each ￿rm in the di⁄erentiated goods sectors is a monopolist for the variety it produces and
sets prices at a constant markup over marginal costs, ps




￿ . Pro￿ts at this price
from sales in market j are ￿s




ij. There are a large number, Mns, of
potential entrants in each country and sector which have to decide in which of the N countries to
sell. Productivity levels ￿ are known to ￿rms before entry. In equilibrium, only ￿rms which can earn
non-negative pro￿ts in a given market will become active on that market, leading to market-pair
speci￿c productivity cuto⁄s, ￿￿
ij;s. Finally, as in Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
I assume that ￿rm-level productivity ￿ in country n, sector s, is Pareto distributed with density
vns(￿) = as (kns)
as ￿￿(as+1), where kns > 0, as > ￿s ￿ 1 and ￿ ￿ kns. For notational ease, I focus
on a single sector and drop the relevant subscript s from now on.
Under the above assumptions I obtain a solution for the entry cuto⁄s ￿￿
























If a ￿rm from i is active in market j, its pro￿ts there can be expressed as a function of the relevant
entry cuto⁄:

























I look at the impact of tari⁄reductions between Canada (i) and the United States (j) on Canadian
￿rms￿pro￿ts. This corresponds to a reduction of ￿ij and ￿ji in the model, where ￿ij denotes the
U.S. import tari⁄ Canadian ￿rms face and ￿ji is the Canadian import tari⁄ U.S. ￿rms have to pay
when exporting to Canada. Note that because of quasi-linear preferences and the assumption of a
￿xed number of incumbents, third market pro￿ts of Canadian ￿rms will not be a⁄ected by changes
in U.S. or Canadian import tari⁄s (see expression (4)). Thus, it is su¢ cient to analyse changes in
domestic pro￿ts (￿ii) and in pro￿ts from exports to the U.S. (￿ij).6 For ￿rms which export both
















where ￿ij denotes the initial tari⁄ and ￿0
ij the new (lower) tari⁄. The relative pro￿t change for




ii for all n. Thus, all active ￿rms serve the domestic
market whereas only the more productive ￿rms export to the U.S. and other markets (which is the empirically relevant
case).
7existing exporters is positive because the domestic cuto⁄ is not a⁄ected and the U.S. export cuto⁄
falls, ￿￿0
ij < ￿￿
ij. For ￿rms which export neither before nor after the tari⁄ reduction, U.S. pro￿ts
(￿ij) are zero and the percentage change in pro￿ts after a lowering of U.S. tari⁄s is also zero because































Thus, existing and new exporters observe stronger relative pro￿t increases than purely domestic
￿rms. From (2), we should thus observe a positive di⁄erence in stock market returns between
new and existing exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival of new information making an
implementation of CUSFTA more likely.7
Next, consider a reduction in Canadian tari⁄s from ￿ji to ￿0
ji. From (4), the export cuto⁄ ￿￿
ij
will not be a⁄ected whereas the domestic entry cuto⁄ ￿￿
ii will rise (￿￿0
ii > ￿￿
ii). Thus, only domestic






































So both exporters and non-exporters lose but losses are more severe for non-exporters. Intuitively,
the part of exporters￿total pro￿t derived from the U.S. market is not a⁄ected by Canadian tari⁄
cuts, so that the relative decline in total pro￿ts is smaller. Secondly, exporters are more productive
and spread the market-speci￿c ￿xed costs over a larger amount of sales. The percentage decline in
domestic pro￿ts alone will thus also be smaller.
Finally, the least productive Canadian ￿rms will exit the domestic market after the reduction
in ￿ji:
7Note that it is not possible to unambiguously rank the relative pro￿t changes of existing exporters and new
exporters. While the most productive new exporter will have a higher percentage pro￿t change than all existing
exporters, the least productive new entrant will have a relative change lower that that of all ￿rms already exporting.
In contrast, absolute pro￿t increases (i.e., ￿￿ rather than ￿￿=￿) are smallest for the least productive new exporter
and increase monotonically with productivity, yielding an unambiguous ranking. I will return to this point in my





















So, to summarize, Canadian tari⁄reductions will reduce pro￿ts of all Canadian ￿rms but exporters
will be less a⁄ected than both continuing and exiting domestic ￿rms. We should thus observe a
positive di⁄erence in stock market returns between exporters and non-exporters upon the arrival
of new information making an implementation of CUSFTA more likely. In contrast, absolute
pro￿t increases (￿￿, rather than ￿￿=￿) are smallest for the least productive new exporter and
monotonically rise with productivity, yielding an unambiguous ranking. I will provide evidence on
this additional prediction in the robustness checks in Section 5.2.
2.3 Discussion
To what extent do these results carry over to alternative modeling frameworks? Chaney (2008)
introduces income e⁄ects in an otherwise identical model by letting his utility function take a Cobb-
Douglas rather than a quasi-linear form. This changes the magnitude of the pro￿t responses but
leaves the qualitative predictions of the previous section intact, as I demonstrate in Appendix A.
Another simplifying assumption of the above model is that wages are exogenously ￿xed and
that there are therefore no factor market interactions. In contrast, such interactions are crucial for
the results in Melitz (2003). While tari⁄s (or more generally, variable trade costs) are assumed to
be symmetric in his model, the general intuition is clear. Lower foreign tari⁄s lead exporters to
expand which puts upward pressure on domestic wages. Non-exporters thus face higher input costs
but do not bene￿t from increased access to foreign markets. In the present context, U.S. tari⁄ cuts
would thus increase the pro￿ts of existing and new exporters relative to continuing and exiting
non-exporters, similar to the predictions from the last section.
A third simpli￿cation which is more critical for the previous results, especially with respect to
domestic tari⁄ reductions, is the assumption of a ￿xed number of potential entrants. For example,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) present a version of their model with long-run entry in which expected
pro￿ts are reduced to zero. In this case, lower U.S. tari⁄s again increase access to the U.S. market
and raise the pro￿ts of exporting ￿rms. This e⁄ect is now reinforced through the exit of U.S. ￿rms
which leave their market in the long-run because of reduced domestic pro￿t opportunities. However,
lower U.S. tari⁄s now also trigger entry into the Canadian market by new domestic ￿rms. This
increases competition there and lowers the domestic pro￿ts of both exporters and non-exporters.
But because demand is assumed to be linear, the percentage pro￿t reduction is again smaller for
the more productive and thus larger exporters (see Appendix A).
In contrast, domestic (Canadian) tari⁄ reductions lead to a reduction in long-run entry which
increases pro￿ts for the remaining ￿rms. At the same time, better access to the Canadian market
leads to increased entry of U.S. ￿rms which also serve their domestic market. This makes it more
di¢ cult for Canadian exporters to sell there, lowering pro￿ts from exporting. Linear demand again
9implies that the less productive non-exporters will see a stronger increase in their domestic pro￿ts
than exporters. In addition, they do not su⁄er a reduction in their export pro￿ts. Thus, in the
free-entry version of Melitz and Ottaviano, Canadian tari⁄ reductions favor those non-exporters in
Canada which do not exit the market entirely (see Appendix A).
Finally, even without long-run entry the result that exporters see their domestic pro￿ts fall by
relatively less than non-exporters in response to import tari⁄ reductions seems to be at least in
part due to speci￿c assumptions about demand and cost structures. In the model from the previous
section, it is the presence of ￿xed costs which causes the relatively smaller fall of domestic pro￿ts
for more productive ￿rms, and in Melitz Ottaviano (2008) it is the assumption of linear demand.
While the existing literature has not yet explored this issue, one could easily imagine a demand
curve with more curvature than CES. This would imply a stronger percentage reaction in domestic
pro￿ts for the more productive exporters and might reverse some of the above results. (With CES
and in the absence of ￿xed cost, relative domestic pro￿t changes are identical for ￿rms with di⁄erent
levels of productivity.)
In summary, the results of the previous section with respect to export tari⁄ reductions seem
robust across a range of heterogeneous ￿rm models. Intuitively, the direct e⁄ect of lower export
tari⁄s is to reduce the e⁄ective cost of supplying goods for the subset of ￿rms which already export
or start exporting while leaving domestic ￿rms (initially) una⁄ected. The result that the former
group of ￿rms increase their pro￿ts relative to the latter in the new equilibrium should thus be quite
general. In contrast, the relative e⁄ect of import tari⁄ reductions on exporters and non-exporters
appears to be less robust, and might well be di⁄erent in more general frameworks than the one
presented here.
3 Description of Events
A key element of any event study is the identi￿cation of suitable events. In the present context, I am
looking for points in time at which the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation changed substan-
tially. This is a potentially di¢ cult challenge, given that the negotiation and rati￿cation process
covered a period of over two years, from the start of negotiations in May 1986 until the eventual
rati￿cation by the Canadian parliament in December 1988. Given that the idea of liberalizing trade
between Canada and the United States had also been around for some time before CUSFTA, the
successful conclusion of negotiations and the subsequent signing and rati￿cation of the agreement
might have been anticipated to a large degree.
Fortunately, the Canadian general election on 21 November 1988 provides a more sharply de￿ned
event which can be usefully exploited for event study evidence.8 The ￿rst reason for this is that the
rati￿cation of CUSFTA was extremely contentious among the main Canadian political parties, with
8Brander (1991) and Thompson (1993) also evaluate whether there were signi￿cant stock market reactions to
CUSFTA but are not primarily interested in testing theories of international trade. A lack of tari⁄ data also pre-
vents them from di⁄erentiating CUSFTA￿ s in￿ uence more clearly from other contemporaneous factors such as the
Conservative election victory.
10the governing Progressive Conservatives (who had negotiated the agreement) in favor, and broad
sections of the main opposition parties (the Liberals and the New Democratic Party) opposed.
Indeed, the Liberal Party￿ s leader, John Turner, publicly vowed as late as October 1988 that he
would dismantle CUSFTA in case of victory in the elections. The fate of CUSFTA thus directly
depended on the election outcome on November 21.
Secondly, CUSFTA received an unprecedented amount of attention in the election campaign
and was indeed the single-most important issue in voters￿minds. In opinion polls taken in the
month before the election, over 80% of the electorate cite CUSFTA as the most important election
issue. Traditional areas of concerns such as in￿ ation, unemployment, the budget de￿cit, welfare
spending or national unity all were each mentioned by at most 2% of voters (Frizzell et al., 1989).
One would thus expect that market reactions to a Conservative or Liberal victory in the elections
would be predominantly determined by the consequences for the implementation of CUSFTA.
Finally, the outcome of the election was highly uncertain. Given the particularities of the
Canadian electoral system, the Conservatives needed a vote share of slightly more than 40% to
obtain a parliamentary majority (see Johnston et al., 1992). As late as the week before the vote
on November 21, however, opinion polls showed Liberals and Conservatives head-to-head at 35%
of the vote each.9 Such an outcome would most likely have given Liberals and New Democrats a
majority of parliamentary seats and would thus have meant that CUSFTA would not be rati￿ed.
The turning point came only with the publication of three nationwide polls on November 19, the
Saturday before the election. All three polls put the Conservatives at over 40% and clearly ahead
of the Liberals. These predictions proved indeed to be almost exactly correct, and on November 21
the Conservatives won the election with 43% of the popular vote, compared to 32% for the Liberal
Party and 20% for the New Democrats.
Besides the election itself, I will look at three earlier events which also changed the likelihood
of CUFTA￿ s implementation. The second event is the reaching of an agreement on CUSFTA
between Canada and the U.S. on 3 October 1987.10 Negotiations had been di¢ cult and were only
brought to a successful conclusion hours before the deadline on October 3. Thus, the reaching of
an agreement was to some extent unexpected. At the same time, many of the key elements of
CUSFTA (including the extent of the tari⁄ reductions) had been agreed already so that market
participants were probably aware of most of its consequences.
The third event is again related to CUSFTA￿ s rati￿cation. On the morning of 20 July 1988,
John Turner, the Liberal Party￿ s leader, announced at a press conference that he had instructed the
Liberal majority in the Senate to block the rati￿cation of CUSFTA until a general election, which
was expected to be called within the next months. This was seen by many as a move to revive the
electoral prospects of his party which was trailing in the opinion polls (Johnston et al., 1992). By
delaying the rati￿cation, John Turner e⁄ectively turned the general election into a referendum on
9All opinion polls quoted in this section are taken from Frizzell et al. (1989).
10The information in this paragraph is based on the extensive coverage of the negotations in the Canadian newspaper
The Globe and Mail from 5 October 1987. Also see Thompson (1993).
11CUSFTA. This move destroyed any hopes for a quick rati￿cation and even raised the possibility
that CUSFTA might not be implemented at all, given the hostility of Liberals and New Democrats
to the agreement.
Finally, I also use a particularly dramatic change in opinion polls in the run-up to the election.
After it had become clear that the Senate would not ratify CUSFTA, prime minister Brian Mul-
roney called a general election on October 1. In the initial phase of the election campaign, the
Conservatives had a clear lead in the opinion polls with a predicted vote share of over 40%. As
discussed above, this was enough to guarantee a parliamentary majority su¢ cient for CUSFTA￿ s
rati￿cation. An important turning point came with the only two televised debates between the
main parties￿leaders on October 24 and 25. Against expectations, John Turner emerged as the
clear winner from these debates and electoral fortunes started to change. The most dramatic and
unexpected event in this phase of the campaign was the publication of a Gallup poll on the morning
of November 7, putting the Liberals at 43% of the vote, compared to only 31% for the Conserva-
tives and 22% for the New Democrats. While opinion polls had been gradually shifting since the
debates, this presented a massive increase in support for John Turner￿ s party and for the ￿rst time
made a Liberal victory look likely.11 In response, the Conservatives undertook a radical overhaul of
their campaign strategy, enabling them to catch up in the opinion polls again (Frizzell et al., 1989).
However, it was only with the above-mentioned publication of three nationwide opinion polls on
November 19 that it became clear that the Conservatives would win.
Table 1 summarizes these events. My principal event is the election day itself (November 21)
and the ￿rst trading day after the election (November 22). While markets could only react to the
election results on November 22, the publication of the opinion polls on November 19 had already
made a Conservative victory very likely.
The remaining three events are less important shifts in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s imple-
mentation but are very useful as robustness checks. In particular, events three and four imply a
decrease in the likelihood of rati￿cation and should lead to opposite stock market reactions from
the election event. Finally, events two and three present changes in the probability of CUSFTA￿ s
implementation which are unrelated to the election outcome. They will provide additional evidence
that market reactions were indeed due to CUSFTA rather than a Conservative election victory.12
11See Brander (1991) and Frizzell et al. (1989). The surprise at the extent of the Liberals￿lead is also evident in
the press coverage of November 8. For example, The Globe and Mail titled ￿Confusion, disbelief greet poll showing
strong Liberal surge￿on November 8 and highlighted market particants￿concerns that a Liberal government would
tear up the free trade agreement.
12As discussed in more detail below, my identi￿cation strategy will also control for additional e⁄ects of a Conserva-
tive victory by relying on variation in tari⁄ cuts across sectors. Moreover, the overwhelming importance of CUSFTA
during the election campaign makes it likely that market reactions on November 21 and 22 were mainly due to the
implications of a Conservative victory for CUSFTA, rather than for other policies.
124 Methodology, Data and Descriptive Statistics
Methodology. Testing the theoretical predictions from Section 2 requires a model of ￿normal￿
stock returns which adjusts for di⁄erences in risk and other characteristics of stocks. A standard
approach in the literature is to use the so-called market model which relates the return on security
i at time t to a stock-speci￿c constant and the return of the market portfolio, Rmt (Campbell et
al., 1989; Binder, 1998):
rit = ￿i + ￿iRmt + "it (6)
The error term "it captures ￿abnormal￿returns which in the present context could be caused by
the arrival of unexpected news about the implementation of CUSFTA. A straightforward way to
measure abnormal returns related to CUSFTA is to directly model the error term in equation (6)
according to the theoretical discussion from Section 2:13
rit = ￿i + ￿iRmt +
XE
e=1 det (dj + ￿1edix) + ￿it (7)
where the det are a set of dummy variables, each taking a value of one for one particular day during
event window E. The dj are industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and dix is a dummy variable which equals one
if ￿rm i exported to the U.S. in the year the event took place. The coe¢ cient estimate ^ ￿1e thus
represents the average abnormal return di⁄erence between exporters and non-exporters on event
day e, after controlling for industry ￿xed e⁄ects. In the case where an event takes place over several
days (as is the case for the ￿rst event in Table 1), I calculate cumulative average abnormal returns





As already discussed, one concern with (7) is that my main event (the general election) not only
changed the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation but also expectations about other policies. For
example, a conservative victory might have been seen as particularly advantageous for exporting
￿rms. I thus make use of the sectoral variation in tari⁄ cuts implemented under CUSFTA by
estimating the following speci￿cation:
rit = ￿i + ￿iRmt +
XE
e=1 det (dj + ￿1edix + ￿2edixd￿CAN;j + ￿3edixd￿US;j) + ￿it (8)
where d￿CAN;j and d￿US;j denote Canadian and U.S. tari⁄ reductions in industry j between 1988
and 1996, respectively.14 Recall from the earlier discussion that exporters should bene￿t more from
higher U.S. tari⁄ cuts than non-exporters (i.e., ￿3 < 0, given that higher reductions imply a more
negative d￿). In the model presented in Section 2 this is also true for Canadian tari⁄cuts, although
13See Binder (1998) for the advantages of measuring abnormal returns in a regression framework.
141996 is the last year for which I have tari⁄ data. Manufacturing tari⁄s were phased out linearly over a period of
up to ten years under CUSFTA and were close to zero in 1996 (see Tre￿ er, 2004).
13it was noted that this prediction might not survive in other heterogeneous ￿rm models.
Introducing variation in tari⁄ cuts into the modeling of abnormal returns means that I only
require the weaker identifying assumption that the di⁄erential impact of a Conservative victory on
exporters and non-exporters does not vary systematically with the extent of U.S. or Canadian tari⁄
cuts. I thus use (8) as my main speci￿cation.
Data. Estimation of (7) and (8) requires data on daily returns on individual stocks and the market
portfolio, the tari⁄ cuts implemented under CUSFTA, as well as information on whether a ￿rm
exports to the U.S. For comparability with the existing literature and because of the availability of
information on tari⁄ reductions, I focus my analysis on ￿rms in the manufacturing sector. Because
of the tradability of its output, this is also the sector most directly a⁄ected by CUSFTA and the
one that corresponds best to the theoretical model from Section 2.
I use daily stock returns from Datastream for all Canadian manufacturing ￿rms listed on one or
several Canadian or U.S. stock exchanges for which I have a least one year of return data prior to
the event studied. This is the standard length in the event study literature for the pre-event window
used to estimate the market model￿ s parameters (see Binder, 1998). I also follow a large part of
the literature by using the value-weighted CRSP portfolio as a proxy for the market portfolio.15
Tari⁄ data are from Tre￿ er (2004) who provides U.S. and Canadian ad-valorem tari⁄s for
manufacturing industries at the four-digit level of the Canadian Standard Industrial Classication
of 1980. I map these tari⁄s into the industry classi￿cation used by Datastream (the Industry
Classi￿cation Benchmark, ICB) which sorts manufacturing ￿rms into 20 broad industries.16
Finding a suitable proxy for export status is more challenging. One issue is that my data only
contain data on ￿rms￿exports for a minority of ￿rms. It is also not clear whether actual export
status would be a good proxy even with perfect data availability. Recall from Section 2 that ￿rms
which start exporting in response to U.S. tari⁄ reductions belong conceptually to the same group
of ￿rms as exporters ￿both observe pro￿t increases relative to ￿rms which never export. In the
present case, new exporters accounted for a large fraction of all exporters. For example, Baldwin
and Gu (2003) report that the fraction of exporters among manufacturing ￿rms increased by almost
70% during the implementation period of CUSFTA. On the other hand, it is impossible to know
whether all of these ￿rms started exporting because of CUSFTA or would have taken up exporting
anyway. Thus, focusing on actual export status risks selecting an inappropriate mix of ￿rms for
15I obtain data on CRSP portfolio returns from the Wharton Research Data Services (wrds.wharton.upenn.edu).
Using the CRSP portfolio should be less susceptible to endogeneity concerns, given that the ￿rms in my sample
represent a large share of the overall market capitalization in purely Canadian-based portfolios such as the S&P/TSX
Composite Index. Also note that CRSP contains a number of Canadian ￿rms quoted on U.S. stock exchanges (but
which only account for a small fraction of overall U.S. market capitalization).
16See Table 2 for a list of these industries. I use detailed descriptions of individual industries obtained from Datas-
tream and Statistics Canada to construct a mapping from Tre￿ er￿ s 213 Canadian Standard Industrial Classi￿cation
(CANSIC) industries to the 20 ICB industries used in this paper. This mapping was unique in 90% of cases, in the
sense that each CANSIC industry could be mapped into one ICB industry only. I aggregate the tari⁄ data to the ICB
level by taking weighted averages across all CANSIC categories mapping into an ICB industry, using 1988 output
shares of CANSIC industries as weights. Output data are also from Tre￿ er (2004).
14treatment and control groups.
Instead, I rely on the theoretical model from Section 2 to derive an alternative proxy. This
model, and all other heterogeneous ￿rm models discussed so far, display a strict hierarchy of (current
or future) export status with respect to productivity and sales. The positive correlation between
￿rm size as measured by sales and export status is also one of the most robust empirical ￿ndings
in the literature on exporter premia (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999). In my baseline speci￿cation,
I thus proxy the export dummies in (7) and (8) by the log of the value of a ￿rm￿ s sales. Using
a continuous measure avoids taking a stance on the exact cuto⁄ value of sales which separates
exporters and non-exporters both before and after CUSFTA. Using log sales also facilitates the
inclusion of number of binary control variables in later robustness checks which are often highly
correlated with ￿rm size (such as multinational status). In extensive robustness checks in Section
5, I experiment with a large number of alternative export proxies, including measures based on
information on actual export status available in my data.17
Sales and export data are also available from Datastream. I complement this information with
data from Compustat North America whenever Datastream has missing values. This yields a
sample of 247 publicly traded Canadian companies with primary activities in manufacturing for
which I have information on sales and stock prices, and a smaller sample of 54 ￿rms for which I
also observe the value of exports.
Descriptive Statistics and Figures. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the number of
￿rms, ￿rm sales and tari⁄ reductions by industry. I note two main points. First, there is a
strong variation in sales within industries, ranging from small start-ups with sales of less than
a million Canadian dollars to big corporations with several billion dollars in turnover. Given
the strong empirical correlation between sales and export status, these ￿gures suggest that there
should be substantial variation in pre- and post-CUSFTA export status within industries, which is
a prerequisite for precise identi￿cation in the econometric analysis carried out below.
Secondly, tari⁄ cuts also show substantial sectoral variation despite the relatively aggregate
industry classi￿cation used here (columns 6-7). Canadian tari⁄ cuts range from sectors which
basically enjoyed free trade before CUSFTA to over 25% for ￿Beverages￿ . U.S. tari⁄ cuts are lower
on average but still show strong sectoral di⁄erences, with tari⁄ cuts between 0% and close to 10%.
Figure 1 takes a closer look at the data by visualizing the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences identi￿cation
strategy embodied in my key speci￿cation, equation (8). I focus on my main event, the general
election on November 21. However, to fully appreciate the high degree of uncertainty surrounding
the election outcome, it is useful to look at a slightly longer window, starting a week before the
televised debates between the main parties￿leaders on October 24 and 25. For this period, I plot
cumulative average return (CAR) di⁄erences between large and small ￿rms, de￿ned here simply
17In general, deviations of my proxies from actual and future export status can be thought of as classical measure-
ment error which will tend to bias the results against ￿nding signi￿cant e⁄ects.
15as ￿rms with sales above and below the 50th percentile in each industry, respectively.18 I plot
CAR di⁄erences for two groups of ￿rms. Those belonging to the 50% of industries with the highest
U.S. tari⁄ cuts implemented under CUSFTA, and those with the 50% lowest tari⁄ cuts.19 CAR
di⁄erences are normalized to zero for both groups one week before the televised debates on October
24 and 25.
The ￿gure clearly shows a sharp divergence in the CAR di⁄erences between high- and low-tari⁄
cut industries in the aftermath of the debates, as the Liberal Party￿ s standing in the polls starts
to improve. Note that this divergence is particularly dramatic on the day of the publication of the
Gallup poll, November 7. Also visible in the graph is the stabilization in CAR di⁄erences between
large and small ￿rms, and between high- and low-tari⁄cut industries, after the Conservatives catch
up in the polls again. (The week beginning November 14 brought a couple of opinion polls showing
the parties head-to-head again.) Finally, the di⁄erence between high- and low-tari⁄ cut industries
narrows sharply on election day, November 21, and to a lesser extent on November 22.
This graphic analysis provides some ￿rst suggestive evidence that stock prices reacted to news
about CUSFTA in a way consistent with the predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models. To see
whether these ￿ndings hold up in a more thorough econometric analysis, I now turn to the estima-
tion of the baseline equations (7) and (8).
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Column 1 of Table 3 reports results based on speci￿cation (7), using log sales as the proxy for
export status. The results indicate that larger ￿rms experienced signi￿cantly higher abnormal
returns ￿about 0.3 percentage points per log point of sales. This is consistent with the predictions
of heterogeneous ￿rm models which predict such a di⁄erential e⁄ect across exporters and non-
exporters, and smaller and larger ￿rms. As already mentioned, this result could also capture a
more positive impact of a Conservative election victory on larger ￿rms.
In column 2, I include the tari⁄ interaction terms as in (8). As predicted, the sign on the U.S.
tari⁄interaction is negative and signi￿cant. Thus, larger ￿rms observed stronger positive abnormal
returns in sectors with larger U.S. tari⁄ cuts. This is strongly supportive of a Melitz-type story in
which exporters bene￿t from increased export opportunities.
Exporters also bene￿ted from higher Canadian tari⁄ cuts relative to non-exporters. This is







ris, where ris is the return of stock i at time s and NG is the number of stocks in group G. The
di⁄erence in CARs between exporters and non-exporters in high tari⁄ cut industries, for example, is then simply
CARXhigh ￿ CARNXhigh. Using abnormal rather than simple returns yields a similar picture.
19I focus on U.S. tari⁄ cuts since the theoretical predictions are unambiguous here. Graphs using Canadian tari⁄
cuts yield a broadly similar if less clear-cut picture. This similarity re￿ ects the positive correlation between U.S. and
Canadian tari⁄ concessions. As we shall see in the econometric analysis below, only U.S. tari⁄ cuts have a robust
impact on abnormal return patterns.
16consistent with the model outlined in Section 2 as well as with Chaney (2008) and the ￿short-run￿
version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). While this e⁄ect is also highly statistically signi￿cant, it is
much smaller in absolute magnitude than the e⁄ect of U.S. tari⁄ reductions, even after taking into
account that Canadian tari⁄ cuts were on average twice as large as U.S. tari⁄ cuts (see Table 2).
5.2 Robustness Checks
Alternative Export Status De￿nitions As a ￿rst robustness check, I experiment with a num-
ber of alternative proxies for export status. Table 4 shows results for several indicators which are
also based on ￿rm sales but which now take a binary form, classifying a ￿rm as an exporter if its
sales exceed a given industry-speci￿c threshold value. Table 5 uses actual export information which
are available for a subsample of 54 ￿rms in my data.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, I classify ￿rms as exporters if their sales are above the 30th
percentile of an industry￿ s sales distribution. This threshold was chosen to match the fraction of
exporters for the subsample of 54 ￿rms for which I observe exports in 1988. Using this alternative
export proxy yields qualitatively identical results to my baseline speci￿cation. Exporting ￿rms
experienced abnormal returns which were 0.9 percentage points higher than those of non-exporters,
with the di⁄erence being highly statistically signi￿cant (column 1). In column 2, I include the tari⁄
interaction terms which are again negative and signi￿cant for both U.S. and Canadian tari⁄s. The
abnormal return di⁄erence between exporters and non-exporters increases by 0.9 percentage points
for each percentage point in U.S. tari⁄reductions, and by 0.2 percentage points for each percentage
point in Canadian tari⁄ reductions.
The 30th percentile threshold is my preferred binary export proxy but I also present results
for cuto⁄s based on more extreme assumptions, ranging from the 20th to the 80th percentile of
industry-speci￿c sales distributions. The 20th percentile threshold rule is again derived from the
fraction of exporting ￿rms in the subsample with export information, but this time also classi￿es
￿rms as exporters if they have positive export sales in either 1988 or in any year of CUSFTA￿ s
implementation period (1989-1997). Implicitly, this assumes that all of these new exporters entered
the export market because of CUSFTA. Since this is a strong assumption, the 20th percentile
threshold should be seen as an upper bound on the true fraction of pre- and post-CUSFTA exporters.
At the other end of the range of the thresholds used in Table 4 is the 80th percentile cuto⁄(columns
9-10), which classi￿es only 20% of ￿rms as exporters. This ￿gure corresponds to the fraction of
exporters among Canadian manufacturing plants in the pre-CUSFTA period reported in Baldwin
and Gu (2003). Since most of these units of production are substantially smaller than the publicly
traded ￿rms in my sample, and since ￿rm and plant size are strongly correlated with export status,
the 80th percent threshold is clearly a lower bound on the number of exporters.20
20Baldwin and Gu (2003) also show the fraction of exporters among plants surveyed for the Annual Surveys of
Manufactures (ASM) in 1984-1996, which are substantially bigger than the average Canadian manufacturing plant
and thus correspond more closely to my sample of publicly traded ￿rms. The fraction of exporters among these plants
rose from 31% in 1984 to 55% in 1996, also within the range of thresholds reported in Table 4.
17Again, the results in columns 3-10 are qualitatively similar to my baseline speci￿cation with the
exception of the results based on the 20th percentile threshold, where the Canadian tari⁄interaction
is positive (albeit small and only marginally signi￿cant). The magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates
is also relatively stable across speci￿cations, with most estimates in the range -0.7 to -1.3 for the
U.S. tari⁄ cut interaction and around -0.05 to -0.20 for the Canadian tari⁄ interaction variable.
Clearly, the pattern that larger ￿rms gained relative to smaller ￿rms, and more so in sectors with
higher U.S. tari⁄ cuts is robust to a wide range of sales-based proxies for export status. The
results related to Canadian tari⁄ reductions also mostly con￿rm my baseline results, although the
magnitude of the reported e⁄ects is again smaller than for U.S. tari⁄ cuts.
Next, I use information on the fraction of exporters per Canadian industry published in Statis-
tics Canada (2000) to introduce sectoral variation in the percentile threshold. As discussed above,
it is likely that exporting is more common among the ￿rms in my sample. Thus, I normalize the
average fraction of exporters across industries to equal 30% as in my binary baseline speci￿ca-
tion, but preserve the sectoral variation present in the Statistics Canada data. This yields export
thresholds ranging from the 90th percentile of the sales distribution in Media to the 5th percentile
in Technology Hardware and Equipment (i.e., the fraction of exporters varies between 10% and
95%).21 Again, the corresponding results are similar to my baseline binary export proxy which
used the 30th percentile uniformly across industries.
Finally, I make use of the more limited information on export sales available in my data. In
columns 1-4 of Table 5, I reestimate equations (7) and (8) for the 54 ￿rms for which I observe
actual exports.22 In columns 1-2, I classify ￿rms as exporters if they report positive export sales
in 1988. In columns 3 to 4, I extend this de￿nition to also include ￿rms which report positive
exports during at least one year of CUSFTA￿ s implementation period (1989-1997). As described
above, these classi￿cations yield exporter shares of 70% and 80%, respectively. The results for
these speci￿cations are again qualitatively similar to before, with exporters experiencing higher
abnormal returns than non-exporters, with the di⁄erence being stronger in sectors with larger U.S.
tari⁄ cuts.
Note that the small size of these two subsample precludes the use of industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
Together with the change in sample structure, this makes a direct comparison of coe¢ cient mag-
nitudes with Table 4 di¢ cult. I thus reestimate equations (7) and (8) for this smaller sample,
excluding industry ￿xed e⁄ects and using the two binary export proxies based on sales thresholds
at the 20th and 30th percentile. The results in columns 5-8 are surprisingly similar to columns 1-4
which use actual export status. Note that Canadian tari⁄ cuts are now estimated to have led to
lower relative returns of exporters, in contrast to most of the results from Table 3 and 4. However,
21I always classify the ￿rm with the lowest sales in an industry as non-exporting, in order to avoid having industries
consisting only of exporters which would then be dropped from the estimation. However, results are similar if I allow
for exporter ratios of 100% and use variation from the remaining industries only (available upon request).
22I only observe the value of total exports, not the value of exports to the United States. However, given that over
80% of Canadian exports between 1988-1997 went to the U.S., any ￿rm that exported during this period is very likely
to have served the U.S. market.
18this result is obtained both when using actual export status and when using my binary proxy based
on sales, again with almost identical coe¢ cient magnitudes. In conclusion, it seems that using sales
as a proxy for export status yields estimates which are very close to proxies based on actual export
information. Results using log sales for this smaller sample are harder to compare quantitatively
to the results for actual export status because of the di⁄erent functional form used. But as seen in
columns 9 and 10, results are again qualitatively similar.
Longer Event Period In the ￿rst column of Table 6, I switch back to my baseline export proxy
(log sales) but extend the event period to include the week before the elections (November 14-22).
This allows me to evaluate to what extent the election results had been anticipated by market
participants. As seen, the size of the coe¢ cient estimates for the U.S. tari⁄ interaction increases
by around 25%, so the election outcome seems to have been priced in to a certain degree already.23
This is not entirely surprising, given that the Conservative Party had been catching up in the
opinion polls in the week prior to the elections. Note, however, that the increase in the coe¢ cient
magnitude is only about 0.025 per additional event day. This is substantially below the comparable
coe¢ cient magnitude for November 21 and 22. Also note that the coe¢ cient on the Canadian tari⁄
cut interaction only changes very little with the extension of the event period. I thus focus on the
more sharply de￿ned event of the election itself (November 21 and 22) for the results reported in
this paper.
Fama-French Portfolios. In the second column of Table 6, I consider a di⁄erent abnormal
returns model. One concern with the standard market model approach is that it does not control
for some important systematic return di⁄erences across ￿rms. For example, Fama and French
(1992) show that ￿rm size (as proxied by market capitalization) and book-to-market equity ratios
are important determinants of the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. The fact that
size by itself is a good predictor of stock returns is potentially problematic, given that I use measures
based on ￿rm sales as my export status proxy in most speci￿cations. One way to address this issue
is to directly control for the role of size in calculating abnormal returns. I do so by using additional
portfolios in the abnormal returns regressions, as suggested by Fama and French (1993):
rit = ￿i+￿i1Rmt+￿i2SMBt+￿i3HMLt+
XE
e=1 det (dj + ￿1edix + ￿2edixd￿CAN;j + ￿3edixd￿US;j)+￿it
where SMBt is the di⁄erence in the returns on portfolios of small and large stocks, and HMLt is
the di⁄erence in the returns of portfolios of high and low book-to-market equity stocks.24
23Here and in the remaining sections of the paper, I focus on my main speci￿cation (8) for the sake of brevity.
Results for speci￿cation (7) are available upon request. The general pattern of the omitted results is consistent with
the predictions discussed in section 2. Events that increased the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation always
led to positive abnormal returns for exporters relative to non-exporters, and events that lowered the likelihood of
implementation led to opposite results.
24As Fama and French, I further subtract the one-month treasury bill rate from individual stock returns and
the return to the market portfolio, Rmt. Data on all three factors were taken from Kenneth French￿ s web page at
19The results in column 2 are very close to my baseline speci￿cation. The most likely explanation
for this similarity to the results based on the simpler market model is that systematic di⁄erences in
abnormal stock returns only become clearly apparent over longer event horizons. For the two-day
window considered here, di⁄erent abnormal return de￿nitions yield almost identical results (also
see the related discussion in Andrade et al., 2001).
Outliers and Changes in Sample Composition. In the third column of Table 6, I reestimate
my baseline speci￿cation (8) but use log returns instead of simple returns as the dependent variable.
This provides a natural way of reducing the importance of return outliers. Again, results are
basically identical to my baseline speci￿cations.
Columns 4 and 5 also deal with potentially in￿ uential observations by dropping sectors with
large tari⁄ reductions from my sample. Column 4 drops the Personal Goods sector which saw the
most substantial reduction in U.S. tari⁄s and the second most important reduction in Canadian
tari⁄s. Column 5 removes the Beverage industry which is a strong outlier in terms of Canadian
tari⁄ cuts (26.6% compared to the next biggest cut of 12.7% in the Personal Goods sector). The
most notable change in results resulting from these regressions is a reduction in the magnitude of
the U.S. tari⁄ interaction, and a corresponding increase in the Canadian tari⁄ interaction term,
when dropping the Beverage industry. Qualitatively, however, the result pattern is again similar to
before, with larger U.S. and Canadian tari⁄reductions leading to higher abnormal return di⁄erences
between larger and small ￿rms.
Finally, column 6 excludes three sectors which combine manufacturing and non-manufacturing
activities as de￿ned by the Canadian Standard Industrial Classi￿cation on which my tari⁄data are
based. These are Oil Equipment & Services (which includes production of construction and mining
machinery but also services related to oil extraction), Healthcare Equipment & Services (which
includes the production of medical equipment and supplies but also services such as operating
hospitals and clinics), and Media (which includes printing and publishing but also broadcasting,
advertising and public relations). Excluding these sectors only leads to minor changes in the baseline
coe¢ cient estimates.
Alternative Tari⁄ Measures. Column 7 of Table 6 experiments with only using the part of
bilateral U.S. and Canadian tari⁄ reductions which exceeds changes in the tari⁄s between these
countries and the rest of the world. Market participants might have used expected tari⁄ changes
due to multilateral initiatives such as the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tari⁄s and
Trade (GATT) as the most likely scenario in the case of a non-rati￿cation of CUSFTA, rather
than no tari⁄ changes at all. Thus, I follow Tre￿ er (20004) by using interaction terms based on
d￿
0
US;j = d￿US;j ￿ d￿USROW;j and d￿
0
CAN;j = d￿CAN;j ￿ d￿CANROW;j as regressors in my baseline
equation, where d￿USROW;j and d￿CANROW;j denote average tari⁄reductions between the U.S. and
the rest of the world (excluding Canada), and between Canada and the rest of the world (excluding
Dartmouth which also contains additional information on their construction.
20the U.S.). These average tari⁄ reductions are again from Tre￿ er (2004). As seen, using the new
adjusted tari⁄s only slightly changes the baseline estimates. This is probably not surprising, given
that the correlation between simple and adjusted tari⁄ reductions is around 90%.
Input Tari⁄s and Multinational Status. In Table 7, I consider two potential alternative
explanations for my results.
A ￿rst concern is that output tari⁄reductions under CUSFTA might partially pick up the impact
of intermediate input tari⁄ reductions. As Amiti and Konings (2007) showed for Indonesia, lower
tari⁄s on imported intermediate inputs can lead to signi￿cant increases in ￿rm-level productivity.
In their sample, these gains were particularly pronounced among ￿rms importing intermediates
directly. In the present case, Canadian tari⁄ reductions lowered the costs of inputs imported from
the U.S. This should have increased pro￿ts of Canadian ￿rms and potentially more so for importers.
If importers are among the largest ￿rms in each industry (as the empirical literature on ￿rm-level
imports does suggest), my interactions of tari⁄ cuts and ￿rm sales could simply be picking up
the e⁄ect of cheaper imported intermediates. This is particularly true given the generally positive
correlation between input and output tari⁄s.25
To control for this possibility, I rerun my baseline speci￿cation but include an additional inter-
action term between reductions in Canadian intermediate input tari⁄s and log sales. I construct
input tari⁄s by using the Canadian input-output matrix together with the information on Canadian
tari⁄reductions used previously. In analogy to Amiti and Konings, I construct the input tari⁄for a






where wkj is the cost share of industry k in the production of goods in industry j in 1988. I construct
input tari⁄s for 1988 and 1996 and use the di⁄erence as my measure of input tari⁄ reductions due
to CUSFTA.
A second potential omitted variable is multinational status. Given that multinational enterprises
(MNEs) tend to be among the largest ￿rms in all sectors, my sales proxy for export status is likely
to be positively correlated with MNE status. Again, my results might thus simply pick up a
di⁄erential impact of tari⁄ reductions on MNEs and non-MNEs. Fortunately, my data contain
information on foreign a¢ liate sales and assets for about 80% of ￿rms in my baseline sample, so
that I can separately identify the impact of export status (log sales) and MNE status.26
Column 1 in Table 7 presents results controlling for intermediate input tari⁄s, column 2 for
multinational status, and column 3 includes both control variables together. As expected, stronger
25In my sample, the correlation of Canadian input tari⁄s with Canadian output tari⁄s is 28%, and the correlation
with U.S. output tari⁄s is 47%. See below for how import tari⁄s were constructed.
26A ￿rm is classi￿ed as an MNE if it either reports positive local a¢ liate sales abroad or owns assets outside of
Canada. Using alternative de￿nitions based on either of these two variables yield almost identical results.
21reductions in input tari⁄s further increase the abnormal return di⁄erence between exporters and
non-exporters as proxied by ￿rm sales. In contrast, MNE status tends to lower abnormal returns
in sectors with higher tari⁄ reductions, ceteris paribus, although the e⁄ect is only statistically and
economically signi￿cant for U.S. tari⁄ reductions. This is consistent with, for example, a tari⁄-
jumping motive for foreign direct investment, in which Canadian MNEs establish U.S. production
sites to avoid export duties on their sales there. As U.S. tari⁄s are eliminated, the value of this
local presence is diminished.
Finally, note that the results relating to U.S. tari⁄ cuts are robust to the inclusion of the above
control variables, and coe¢ cient magnitudes are similar to our baseline speci￿cation. In contrast,
the Canadian tari⁄ interaction term becomes insigni￿cant or even slighlty positive once we control
for MNE status. This reinforces the impression from the previous robustness checks that the
￿ndings related to Canadian tari⁄ reductions are less robust to changes in the estimation equation.
Placebo Checks. I now turn to settings for which I would not expect to ￿nd signi￿cant abnormal
return di⁄erences between exporters and non-exporters, nor a strong variation of these di⁄erences
across industries with high and low tari⁄ cuts. Speci￿cally, I estimate speci￿cation (8) for dates
between 1 November 1987 and 30 June 1988, a period during which the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s
implementation did not vary substantially. I repeatedly draw two consecutive dates from this period
at random and estimate (8) for these dates. I then calculate cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) based on my estimates of ^ ￿1e, ^ ￿2e and ^ ￿3e for these random two-day event windows. I
repeat this procedure 1,000 times, thus obtaining a set of 1,000 CAARs estimates comparable to
the ones presented in Table 3. I report means, standard deviations and percentiles of the resulting
distributions in Table 8.
In the light of the earlier theoretical discussion, one would not expect export status to matter
much as a determinant of abnormal returns in this earlier period, both on its own and when
interacted with tari⁄ cuts. On the other hand, if my results so far were picking up some general
characteristics of ￿rms or sectors correlated with export status and tari⁄ cuts, one would expect
parameter estimates of the same magnitude as in my baseline results to show up more frequently
than expected from pure sampling variation. For example, if large ￿rms in sectors with high
future U.S. tari⁄ cuts systematically experienced above average abnormal returns, my baseline and
additional results might be due to some (unknown) omitted factor. Table 8 shows that this is not
the case, at least for the U.S. tari⁄ cut interaction. The probability of observing two-day U.S.-
tari⁄-related CAARs on randomly chosen dates which are as large or larger than the magnitudes
reported in Table 3 is only about 3%. In contrast, the probability of randomly generating two-day
Canadian tari⁄-related CAARs larger than in Table 3 is somewhat higher at around 30%. In both
cases, however, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that that the mean of my generated CAARs
is equal to zero (see column 3).27
27In unreported results, I also used equation (7) to compare abnormal return di⁄erences between large and small
￿rms in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, where the latter where supposedly less a⁄ected by CUS-
22Absolute Price Changes Instead of Returns. The model from Section 2 also provides an
interesting additional testable prediction related to absolute price changes which I brie￿ y discuss
here. Recall that in response to Canadian tari⁄reductions, domestic Canadian ￿rms were predicted
to see a relatively larger fall in pro￿ts than exporters relative to initial pro￿ts. However, the absolute
decline in pro￿ts (i.e., ￿￿ rather than ￿￿=￿) is smallest for the least productive ￿rms and largest
for the most productive ones. So absolute price changes (￿p rather than ￿p=p) should be more
negative for the more productive exporters than for purely domestic ￿rms.28 In contrast, the
ranking of absolute pro￿t changes of Canadian ￿rms remains unchanged when looking at U.S. tari⁄
reductions. Existing and new exporters see stronger increases than non-exporters, thus implying
that the former should see stronger absolute price increases than the latter.29
I test this additional prediction by using absolute price changes (pt ￿pt￿1) rather than returns
as the dependent variable in a speci￿cation based on (8). Using absolute price changes has of course
the strong disadvantage that the methodological framework of event studies no longer applies. In
particular, the inclusion of stock-speci￿c correlations with the market portfolio no longer has a
theoretical basis. Thus, I estimate an adhoc variant of (8) of the form:













In Table 9, I show results for my log-sales proxy as well as for the preferred binary export proxy
from Section 5.2, which uses the 30th percentile of industry sales to separate exporters and non-
exporters. Interestingly, the Canadian tari⁄ interaction does indeed change sign although it is only
signi￿cant for the binary export proxy. Also consistent with the model￿ s predictions, the coe¢ cient
on the U.S. tari⁄interaction remains positive and highly signi￿cant. Thus, although the theoretical
foundations of these additional results are less robust than that of my baseline speci￿cation, they
provide additional support for the predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models.
Additional Events. In conclude my robustness checks by presenting results for the three addi-
tional events discussed in Section 3. In Table 10, column 1, I focus on the ￿rst trading day after the
FTA. This comparison is not unproblematic since it precludes the use of tari⁄ variation in the identi￿cation (tari⁄
data are of course not available for the service sector). CUSFTA also included a number of provisions which might
have led to di⁄erential abnormal return reactions between large and small ￿rms in non-manufacturing sectors, such
as initiatives to liberalize trade in services or make government procurement procedures more accessible to foreign
￿rms (see CUSFTA, 1988, Parts 3-5). Nevertheless, regressing returns on log sales and an interaction term between
log sales and a dummy for manufacturing yielded a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction, indicating
higher abnormal return di⁄erences in manufacturing.
28From (1), pit ￿ pit￿1 = e
￿1




















ii, prices should decline by more for more productive ￿rms. Note, however, that discount rates ei do not
cancel out when looking at absolute price changes. So for exporters to see stronger absolute price declines, I need the
additional assumption that di⁄erences in ei are either unrelated to productivity or at least not su¢ ciently higher for
more productive ￿rms.
29This again assumes that there are no systematic and su¢ ciently large di⁄erences in discount rates (see the
previous footnote). Also note that, in contrast to relative pro￿t changes, the ranking of new and existing exporters is
now unambiguous, with the most productive existing exporters experiencing the strongest absolute pro￿t and price
increases (compare footnote 7).
23successful conclusion of negotiations on October 3, 1987. Similar to the election outcome itself, this
event increased the likelihood of an implementation of CUSFTA. Consistent with the theoretical
discussion from Section 2, I ￿nd stronger abnormal returns of exporters relative to non-exporters
in industries with higher U.S. tari⁄ cuts. The same is also true for Canadian tari⁄ reductions,
although the size of the corresponding coe¢ cient is again an order of magnitude smaller.
In column 2, I look at the e⁄ect of John Turner￿ s announcement that he had instructed the
Liberal majority in the Canadian Senate to block CUSFTA until after a general election. In column
3, I focus on the impact of the publication of the Gallup poll on November 7 which predicted a twelve
percentage point lead for the Liberal Party. Both events lowered the likelihood of a rati￿cation of
CUSFTA. According to the theoretical predictions, one would thus expect to see an e⁄ect opposite
to the ￿rst two events. This is indeed what I ￿nd. The positive coe¢ cient estimates on all the
U.S. tari⁄ interactions indicate indeed that exporters experienced more negative abnormal returns
than non-exporters in sectors in which CUSFTA foresaw higher tari⁄ cuts. The coe¢ cients for the
Canadian tari⁄ cut interaction are also positive and statistically signi￿cant, albeit only at the 5%
level on July 20.30
Interestingly, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates for all three additional events is smaller
than that of the estimates relating to my baseline event, the Conservative election victory on
November 21-22 (see Table 3, column 2). This is consistent with the idea that the latter event
presented the most signi￿cant change in CUSFTA￿ s implementation probability, given that its
rati￿cation by the Canadian parliament was far from assured just before the election but almost
certain right after the Conservative victory (see below for a more detailed discussion of changes in
implementation probabilities).
5.3 Quanti￿cation of Results
I now analyze the quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated abnormal return dif-
ferences more closely. I present two sets of ￿gures. First, predicted abnormal returns are easily
computed using a simple transformation of my baseline equation (8):
E (ariE) =
XE
e=1 det (dj + ￿1edix + ￿2edixd￿CAN;j + ￿3edixd￿US;j) (10)
where E (arit) denotes the expected value of the abnormal returns of stock i during event window
E (here, the election victory of the Progressive Conservatives on November 21 and 22).
Secondly, under further assumptions about the probability of CUSFTA￿ s implementation prior
to and after the Conservative election victory, I can also compute implied pro￿t changes. To see
this, I use the link between returns and pro￿ts implicit in equation (1), and solve for pro￿t changes
as a function of abnormal returns and ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities:
30In unreported results, I show that export status as proxied by log sales is also correlated with abnormal returns
in the expected way when not relying on variation in tari⁄ cuts (as in Table 3, column 1, for my baseline event).
That is, estimating equation (7) for these additional events yields a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on log sales
for event 2, and a negative and signi￿cant one for events 3 and 4.
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where art are abnormal returns between periods t and t + ", ￿iC are per-period pro￿ts after a
successful implementation of CUSFTA, and ￿iNC per-period pro￿ts without CUSFTA. It denotes
information available at time t, and probCt and probCt+" the probability of a successful imple-
mentation of CUSFTA before and after the Conservative election victory, respectively. Intuitively,
the size of the estimated abnormal returns is a function of pro￿ts under the free-trade regime and
the alternative scenario without tari⁄ cuts, as well as the change in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s
implementation brought about by the Conservative election victory (controlling for the ex-ante
probability, probCt).
The ￿rst line of the ￿rst column of Table 11 reports average predicted abnormal returns for
exporters and non-exporters for the election event window on November 21 and 22. I ￿rst use my
preferred binary measure of export status (see Table 4, column 2) to compute abnormal returns,
since the 0-1 classi￿cation of ￿rms into exporters and non-exporters used there makes the pre-
sentation of results straightforward. According to these estimates, exporters experienced average
abnormal returns of around 0.9% and non-exporters of around -0.1%, yielding a predicted di⁄erence
of around one percentage point.
As has been noted before, these abnormal returns are also likely to be in￿ uenced by the general
impact of a Conservative election victory on stock markets, and possibly by a di⁄erential impact
across smaller and larger ￿rms (e.g., if the Conservatives were perceived to be ￿pro big business￿ ).
To strip out these two types of confounding impacts, columns 2 and 3 present average predicted
abnormal returns based on (10) but disregard industry ￿xed e⁄ects (column 2) or industry ￿xed
e⁄ects and the non-interacted export dummy (dix, column 3) in the return computation. Focusing
on these parts of abnormal returns, which are more closely linked to the predictions of heterogenous
￿rm models, yields a somewhat larger return di⁄erence between exporters and non-exporters of
around 1.1 percentage points (column 2) and 2.7 percentage points (column 3).
Columns 4-6 compute the same statistics but use estimates based on my baseline measure of
export status, the log of ￿rm sales (see Table 3, column 2). For comparison with the previous
binary measure, I classify all ￿rms as exporters which have sales above the 30th percentile of their
respective industry (but I do use their actual sales value to compute predicted abnormal returns).
Results in columns 4-6 are very similar to columns 1-3, with estimated return di⁄erences of one
percentage points for the full speci￿cation with industry ￿xed e⁄ects, 1.1 percentage points for
the speci￿cation excluding industry ￿xed, and 3.1 percentage points for the speci￿cation excluding
both industry ￿xed e⁄ects and the level term in log sales.
In lines 2-5 of Table 11, I present results for implied pro￿t changes, using di⁄erent sets of
25assumptions about ex-ante and ex-post implementation probabilities. Given the strong support for
CUSFTA voiced by the Conservatives and the fact that their representatives had negotiated the
agreement in the ￿rst place, it seems appropriate to set the ex-post implementation probability
to 100% in all scenarios. The implied pro￿t change is thus determined by assumptions about the
ex-ante likelihood of implementation. In line 2, I use a value of 0% which is the most conservative
assumption in the sense of yielding the smallest implied pro￿t changes. The corresponding results
thus provides a useful lower bound for the true pro￿t impact of CUSFTA. Lines 3-5 make more
realistic assumptions about the ex-ante probabilities. As discussed, the likelihood of a Conservative
election victory was estimated by most observers to be not more than 50% prior to the publication
of the opinion polls on November 19 (a Saturday). Thus, in lines 3-5 I choose ex-ante probabilites
centered around 50% (30%, 50% and 70%, respectively).
As can be easily veri￿ed from (11), implied pro￿t changes are equal to abnormal returns in the
most conservative scenario of a 0%-100% change in the implementation probability of CUSFTA,
and increase for higher ex-ante probabilities. Depending on the speci￿c way of calculating predicted
abnormal returns and the assumptions about ex-ante probabilities, the average implied di⁄erence
in pro￿t changes between exporters and non-exporters lies between 1 and 10 percentage points
for my binary export proxy. The corresponding results for my log-sales measures span a slightly
wider range, reaching from one percentage point to close to 14 percentage points in the least
conservative scenario. In my view, these magnitudes are clearly economically signi￿cant but not
implausibly large given the substantial e⁄ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian manufacturing sector
found previously by authors such as Tre￿ er (2004).
6 Conclusions
This paper presented new empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous ￿rm models.
Using the uncertainty surrounding the negotiation and rati￿cation of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and 1988, I showed that the pattern of abnormal returns of Canadian
manufacturing ￿rms was broadly consistent with the predictions of a class of models based on Melitz
(2003).
Speci￿cally, the election victory of the ruling Conservative party (a strong supporter of CUS-
FTA) led to signi￿cant stock market gains of exporting ￿rms relative to non-exporters. Moreover,
these relative gains were higher in sectors with larger U.S. tari⁄ cuts. The same pattern was also
found for earlier events which increased the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s implementation. In contrast,
events which lowered the likelihood of implementation resulted in negative abnormal returns of ex-
porters relative to non-exporters. Again, these losses were stronger in sectors with higher expected
U.S. tari⁄ cuts.
Results for Canadian tari⁄ cuts were slightly less consistent across speci￿cations. While most
results indicate that exporting ￿rms also gained relative to non-exporting ￿rms in response to such
tari⁄ reductions, the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates were generally small, sometimes insignif-
26icant and had the wrong sign in a few cases. I noted that this is not necessarily evidence against
the relevance of heterogeneous ￿rm models in general, given that many of the existing theoretical
results on domestic tari⁄ reductions seem to depend on assumptions about market entry and spe-
ci￿c functional forms (e.g., linear demand or ￿xed costs) and need not carry over to more general
settings.
To evaluate the quantitative importance and plausibility of the estimated return di⁄erences, I
also calculated the CUSFTA-induced change in the expected future pro￿ts of active ￿rms implied
by my estimates. Based on assumptions about the change in the likelihood of CUSFTA￿ s imple-
mentation brought about by the Conservative election victory, I estimated that CUSFTA increased
exporters￿per-period pro￿ts by 6%-7% relative to non-exporters in the most plausible scenarios,
and up to 14% under more extreme assumptions.
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A Theoretical Predictions
In this appendix, I derive predictions for the impact of trade liberalization on pro￿ts using two
recent and in￿ uential models of heterogeneous ￿rms: Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Chaney
(2008). Both allow for asymmetric country sizes and tari⁄ barriers, which makes them particularly
suitable for analyzing bilateral agreements such as CUSFTA, but still deliver closed-form solutions
for relative pro￿t changes. Below, I keep the authors￿notation to facilitate the comparability of
the analysis with the original contributions.
28A.1 Chaney (2008)
I start with Chaney￿ s extension of Melitz (2003) to asymmetric countries and trade barriers which is
very similar to the model outlined in Section 2 of this paper. The main di⁄erence is that his upper-
level utility function takes a Cobb-Douglas rather than a quasi-linear form, so that expenditure
on the di⁄erentiated goods sector is not exogeneously ￿xed but depends on wages and pro￿ts. In
equilibrium, however, total expenditure is a ￿xed multiple of wage income. Since, similar to my
own analysis, wages are ￿xed through the presence of a freely traded numeraire good, expenditure
is a function of exogeneous parameters only. The analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on
pro￿ts is thus identical to my own, as I brie￿ y demonstrate now.
Speci￿cally, in Chaney￿ s model ￿rm-level pro￿ts of a ￿rm in i with productivity ’ from serving





where pij (’) is the price charged in country j by a ￿rm from country i with productivity ’, qij (’)
is the local demand in j associated with this price, fij are ￿xed costs in units of the numeraire
associated with entering a market j from i, and ￿ denotes the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in the underlying CES subutility function.
Using equilibrium outcomes for prices, demand and productivity cuto⁄s (see equations 8 and 9
in Chaney), pro￿ts can be rewritten as:






where ￿ ’ij is the minimum productivity level of ￿rms exporting from i to j, which in turn can
be written as a function of income (Yj), variable trade costs (￿ij), the shape parameter ￿ of the























Note the similarity to my earlier cuto⁄ equation (4). In particular, the key parameters for the
analysis of trade liberalizations (￿) enter in the exact same way. Thus, changes in cuto⁄s will
be identical to my simpli￿ed version presented earlier. Together with the fact that pro￿ts can be
written as a function of cuto⁄s as before, implies that all of my previous results carry through.
In particular, new and existing exporters will see stronger relative pro￿t increases compared to
domestic Canadian ￿rms as a reaction to lower U.S. tari⁄s; and lower Canadian tari⁄s will lead to
proportionately higher losses for domestic ￿rms than for exporters.
A.2 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
The model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) contains a number of di⁄erences compared to Chaney
(2008) and the model of Section 2, such as linear demand and variable markups. Key for our
analysis, however, is the distinction between the ￿short-run￿version of their model, in which the
number of potential entrants is ￿xed as before, and the ￿long-run￿version in which the number of
31￿5 collects constants in ￿, ￿, and ￿ (see footnote 11 in Chaney).
29potential entrants is determined by a free entry condition. Similar to the model of Section 2 and
Chaney (2008), wages are exogeneously ￿xed via the presence of a freely tradable numeraire good.
In the following, I focus on the two-country version of Melitz and Ottaviano (see Section 3 of
their paper) and retain their original notation. The pro￿ts of a domestic ￿rm can be split into
pro￿ts derived from domestic sales and pro￿ts derived from export sales (￿D and ￿X, respectively).


















where c denotes the marginal costs of a ￿rm, and LH and LF the number of consumers in the
home (Canadian) and foreign (U.S.) market, respectively. Iceberg-type trade costs associated with
exporting to the U.S. are denoted by ￿F, and ￿ captures the degree of di⁄erentiation between
products (see Melitz and Ottaviano, p. 297). Finally, cH
D and cH
X are the threshold levels of marginal
costs above which Canadian ￿rms do not enter their domestic and the U.S. market, respectively.






































where ￿F denotes the initial tari⁄ and
￿


















































The change in pro￿ts is thus determined by the change in the cuto⁄s and (for U.S. tari⁄reductions)
the direct impact of lower U.S. import tari⁄s (￿F).
For most of their analysis, Melitz and Ottaviano assume a Pareto parameterization of the cost
draws c, i.e. G(c) = (c=cM)
k with c￿[0;cM]. They also distinguish between short-run and long-run
e⁄ects as discussed. In the short run, the number of incumbent ￿rms in Canada and the U.S. is
￿xed at ￿ NH
D and ￿ NF
D, respectively. Incumbents observe their cost draw c and decide whether to























M and ￿ cH
M denote the upper bound of the distribution of marginal costs of incumbent ￿rms
in the two countries. In the long run, with the number of incumbent ￿rms determined by a zero












Export cuto⁄s are simply the other country￿ s domestic cuto⁄, divided by the trade costs of accessing
the foreign market (for Canada, cH
X = cF
D=￿F). Thus, in the short-run cH









































Taking partial derivates of the domestic cuto⁄with respect to the two tari⁄s, I obtain @cH
D=@￿F = 0
and @cH
D=@￿H > 0. That is, unilateral domestic liberalization lowers the domestic cost cuto⁄ (i.e.,
the least e¢ cient ￿rms exit), whereas lower U.S. tari⁄s have no impact. Likewise, @cH
X=@￿F < 0 and
@cH
X=@￿H = 0, i.e., U.S. tari⁄ reductions raise the cost cuto⁄ (less e¢ cient ￿rms start exporting)
but Canadian tari⁄ reductions have no impact.
Starting with the response to U.S. tari⁄ reductions, I again compare the pro￿t changes for

































































































That is, as in Section 2 new and continuing exporters gain relative to domestic ￿rms in response
to U.S. tari⁄ reductions.
Looking next at Canadian tari⁄reductions, pro￿t changes for exporters, and for continuing and


































































































Thus, Canadian tari⁄ reductions will reduce pro￿ts of all Canadian ￿rms but exporters will be less
a⁄ected than both continuing and exiting domestic ￿rms. Intuitively, the part of exporters￿total
pro￿t derived from the U.S. market is not a⁄ected by Canadian tari⁄ cuts, so that the relative
decline in total pro￿ts is smaller. Secondly, linear demand implies that the percentage loss in
domestic pro￿ts is smaller for more productive and thus bigger ￿rms. To summarize, the short-run
predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano with respect to pro￿ts (and thus stock prices) are identical to
the model from Section 2.
A.2.2 Long-run e⁄ects33













The corresponding changes in pro￿ts in response to U.S. tari⁄ reductions for continuing domestic









































































































































Intuitively, U.S. tari⁄ reductions increase export pro￿ts which raises pro￿ts of exporters relative to
non-exporters. Domestic pro￿ts are reduced for all ￿rms but the percentage pro￿t decline is again
stronger for non-exporters because of linear demand.
33Note that all results in this subsection are comparisons of two long-run equilibria. They are thus best understood
as applying only to those ￿rms active in both equilibria.
32On the other hand Canadian tari⁄reductions make continuing never-exporters better o⁄relative
to continuing exporters and ￿rms which leave the export market and only sell domestically. This
is because export pro￿ts decrease and the increase in domestic pro￿ts is stronger for the (smaller)









































































































33Table 1: Summary of Events 
Event Description  Event Date  Likelihood of CUSFTA’s 
implementation 
1.  Three nationwide opinion polls put the Conservative 
Party ahead of the opposition on Saturday, November 
19. The Conservatives win the election on November 21. 
November 21 
and 22, 1988  Strongly increased 
2.  The United States and Canada reach an agreement on 
CUSFTA on Saturday, October 3, 1987. 
October 5, 
1987  Increased 
3.  John Turner instructs the Liberal majority in the 
Canadian Senate to block the ratification of CUSFTA 
until after a general election. 
July 20, 1988  Decreased 
4.  A Gallup poll published on the morning of November 7 
shows a twelve percentage point lead for the oppositional 
Liberal Party. 
November 7, 
1988  Decreased 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Industry # 
Sales 
dCAN d US 
Median Min  Max 
Aerospace & Defense  10  238.7  39.5  1456.4  -2.7%  -2.6% 
Automobiles & Parts  6  412.0  113.2  15943.3  -0.4%  -0.2% 
Beverages 9  57.1  4.7  4611.0  -26.6%  -1.8% 
Chemicals 7  158.0  32.8  1385.4  -5.2%  -4.5% 
Construction & Materials  21  206.5  0.7  4715.0  -6.0%  -2.9% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment  14  72.3  0.1  1797.7  -3.3%  -2.7% 
Food Producers  19  354.5  3.2  3804.0  -4.3%  -2.2% 
Forestry & Paper  22  526.1  43.1  5819.1  -3.3%  -0.6% 
General Industrials  8  467.5  1.5  6499.8  -7.5%  -2.8% 
Healthcare Equipment & Services  4  33.0  0.3  205.9  -4.3%  -2.8% 
Household  Goods  12  101.8 10.4 450.5  -8.2%  -3.0% 
Industrial Engineering  18  97.2  2.7  1737.5  -0.8%  -0.4% 
Industrial Metals  24  408.6  0.1  10175.0  -2.8%  -2.0% 
Leisure Goods  6  308.9  93.7  1110.5  -4.6%  -3.0% 
Media 27  159.2  0.2  4467.9  0.0%  0.0% 
Oil Equipment & Services  20  14.5  0.7  3941.0  -2.3%  -1.5% 
Personal Goods  3  157.1  8.7  1217.2  -12.7%  -8.7% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  6  0.9  0.1  156.3  -4.7%  -2.3% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment  9  28.5  2.7  6451.3  -1.6%  -1.9% 
Tobacco  2  2629.2 413.9 4844.5  -1.4%  0.0% 
Total 247  178.3  0.1  15943.3  -5.1%  -2.3% 
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics on the number of firms per industry, firm-level sales (in mill. 
$CND), and average tariff cuts implemented under CUSFTA. See text for details.Figure 1: Cumulative average returns during the Canadian election campaign of 1988 
 
Notes: Figure shows differences in cumulative average returns (CARs) between firms above and below the 
50
th sales percentile in each industry for two groups: the 50% of industries with the largest U.S. tariff cuts 
and the 50% of industries with the smallest U.S. tariff cuts. All CARs are normalised to zero on Oct. 17 
and calculated at the end of each day (i.e., CARt-CARt-1 measures the market reaction on day t).  
 
Table 3: Baseline Results 
  (1) (2) 
  Return Return 
de * dx 0.003  -0.006 
 (9.936)**  (12.661)** 
de * dx * dUS   -0.420 
   (18.832)** 
de * dx * dCAN   -0.015 
   (3.745)** 
Export Status Definition  log(sales)  log(sales) 
Firms 247  247 
Event Window  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window  2 days  2 days 
Observations Event Window  494  494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (t-stats in 
brackets, based on standard errors clustered per trading day). The dependent variable is daily stock 
returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables are event 
dummies (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions between event dummies, export 
status and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS). Both columns use a continuous definition 
of export status (log sales). All specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event 





















Low Tariff Cuts High Tariff CutsTable 4: Alternative Proxies for Export Status based on Firm Sales 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return 
de * dx  0.009 -0.015 0.019 -0.009 0.007 -0.024 0.008 -0.020 0.004 -0.013 0.014 -0.012 
  (7.923)**  (8.461)** (12.325)** (3.548)**  (6.661)** (12.428)** (8.815)** (14.059)** (4.996)** (12.861)** (11.799)** (7.512)** 
de * dx * dUS   -0.928  -1.792  -1.311  -1.351  -0.755  -1.140 
    (7.991)**   (11.689)**  (13.568)**  (17.165)**  (13.939)**  (14.625)** 
de * dx * dCAN   -0.208  0.084  -0.166  -0.061  -0.065  -0.097 























































2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days 
Observations 
Event Window 
494  494  494  494  494  494  494  494  494  494  494  494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered 
per trading day). The dependent variable is daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables shown in the 
table are an event dummy (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions between the event dummy, export status and Canadian tariff cuts 
(dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS), respectively. Firms are classified as exporters if their sales are bigger than the percentile of their industry’s sales distribution 
indicated in row 5. All specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event dummy. See text for details. +, *, and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Table 5: Actual Export Status and Comparison with Proxies based on Sales 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return 
de * dx  0.016 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.002 
  (14.266)** (12.098)** (14.726)** (10.993)** (16.220)** (11.151)** (15.854)** (11.511)** (14.798)** (10.639)** 
de * dx * dUS   -0.338  -0.380  -0.386  -0.299  -0.051 
   (8.122)**  (9.551)**   (10.615)**   (8.430)**   (10.062)** 
de * dx * dCAN   0.061  0.064  0.057  0.061  0.009 
   (3.056)**  (4.989)**  (7.814)**  (8.137)**  (9.785)** 


















Firms 54  54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Event Window  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 21-22 
Event Window Length 2 days  2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days  2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 
Observations Event Window  108  108 108 108 108  108 108 108 108 108 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered 
per trading day). The dependent variable is daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables shown in the 
table are an event dummy (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions between the event dummy, export status and Canadian tariff cuts 
(dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS), respectively. In columns 1-4, I use actual export status. In columns 5-6 and 7-8, firms are classified as exporters if their sales are 
larger than the 30
th and 20
th percentile of their industry’s sales distribution, respectively.  Columns 9 and 10 use a continuous definition of export status (log 
sales). See text for details. +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Table 6: Longer Event Period, Fama-French Portfolios, Log Returns, Influential Sectors, Adjusted Tariffs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Return Return  Log  Return  Return Return Return Return 
de * dx  -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
  (7.089)**  (7.357)** (13.795)** (9.626)** (11.090)** (6.660)**  (2.480)* 
de * dx * dUS  -0.539 -0.425 -0.438 -0.333 -0.185 -0.369 -0.345 
  (6.605)**  (10.007)** (18.687)** (13.870)**  (3.695)**  (16.889)** (11.787)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.011 -0.018 -0.014 -0.016 -0.134 -0.011 -0.014 
  (0.759) (2.651)**  (3.706)**  (3.864)**  (4.274)**  (2.551)* (2.060)* 
Abnormal Returns Model  Market Model  Fama-French  Market Model  Market Model  Market Model  Market Model  Market Model 
Sectors excluded?  None  None  None  Personal Goods  Beverages  Mixed Sectors  None 
Tariffs Unadjusted  Unadjusted Unadjusted Unadjusted Unadjusted Unadjusted Minus  RoW 
Export  Status  Definition  log(sales) log(sales) log(sales) log(sales) log(sales) log(sales) log(sales) 
Firms  247 247 247 244 238 196 247 
Event Window  Nov. 14-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window  7 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days  2 days 
Observations  Event  Window  1729  494 494 488 476 392 494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from OLS regressions (figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading 
day). The dependent variable is daily stock returns in columns 1-2 and 4-7, and log returns in columns 3. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). 
The independent variables shown in the table are an event dummy (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions between the event dummy, 
export status and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS), respectively. All columns use a continuous definition of export status (log sales). All 
specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event dummy. See text for details. +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  Table 7: Input Tariffs and MNE Status as Controls 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
  Return Return Return 
de * dx -0.011  -0.009  -0.016 
 (12.645)**  (13.394)**  (8.249)** 
de * dx * dUS  -0.395 -0.555  -0.480 
 (17.511)**  (15.780)**  (10.915)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.011 0.003 0.011 
 (2.581)*  (0.487)  (2.148)* 
de * dx * dINPUT  -0.118   -0.192 
 (6.162)**    (3.819)** 
de * dMNE   0.018  0.017 
   (10.840)**  (10.509)** 
de * dMNE * dUS   0.681  0.649 
   (6.760)**  (6.252)** 
de * dMNE * dCAN   0.045  0.042 
   (0.987)  (0.928) 
      
Export Status Definition  log(sales)  log(sales)  log(sales) 
Firms 247  194  194 
Event Window  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window  2 days  2 days  2 days 
Observations Event Window  494  388  388 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). The dependent variable is 
daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables 
shown in the table are event dummies (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions 
between the event dummy, export status and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS), 
respectively. Columns 1 and 3 also include triple interactions between event dummies, export status 
and intermediate input tariffs (dINPUT), and columns 2 and 3 include triple interactions of event 
dummies, MNE status (dMNE) and U.S. or Canadian tariff cuts. All columns use a continuous definition 
of export status (log sales). All specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event 
dummy. +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 8: Parameter Estimates for Non-Event Dates 





1st  5th  10th 50th 90th 95th 99th 
β1e, log sales export 
proxy 
0.000 
(0.003)  1.10  -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.008 
β2e, Can. tariff-export 
status interaction, log 
sales export proxy 
-0.001 
(0.032)  1.48  -0.077 -0.053 -0.047 -0.001 0.039 0.048 0.064 
β3e, U.S. tariff-export 
status interaction, log 
sales export proxy 
0.001 
(0.192)  0.09  -0.478 -0.312 -0.251 -0.012 0.258 0.305 0.438 
Number of draws  1,000 
Number of firms  247 
Length Event Window  2 days
Obs. Event Window  494 
Notes: Table shows means, standard deviation and percentiles for the distributions of coefficient 
estimates shown in the left column. Also shown is the t-stat of a regression of the coefficient estimates 
on a constant (column “Test mean≠0”). The coefficient estimates were obtained by estimating 
equation (8) in the main text for randomly chosen pairs of consecutive days in the period 1 November 
1987 to 30 June 1988. Results are based on 1,000 repetitions. See text and Table 3 for further details. 
 
 
Table 9: Absolute Price Changes 
  (1) (2) 
  pt-pt-1 p t-pt-1 
de * dx -0.012  -0.065 
 (1.437)  (1.394) 
de * dx * dUS  -1.392 -16.549 
  (3.480)** (5.481)** 
de * dx * dCAN  0.252 2.909 
 (1.456)  (2.227)* 
Export Status Definition  log(sales) binary  (sales>30
th percentile)
Firms 247  247 
Event Window  Nov. 21-22  Nov. 21-22 
Length Event Window  2 days  2 days 
Observations Event Window  494  494 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal price changes from market-model OLS regressions 
(figures in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). The dependent 
variable is daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equation 9). The independent 
variables shown in the table are event dummies (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple 
interactions between the event dummy, export status and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or US tariff 
cuts (dUS), respectively. All specifications include industry fixed effects interacted with the event 
dummy. +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Table 10: Additional Events 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Return Return Return 
de * dx -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (2.197)*  (1.883)+  (0.085) 
de * dx * dUS  -0.062 0.058 0.099 
  (7.491)** (5.997)** (6.405)** 
de * dx * dCAN  -0.005 0.005 0.028 
  (3.525)** (2.374)* (8.703)** 
Export Status Definition  log(sales)  log(sales)  log(sales) 
Firms 247  247  247 
Event Window  Oct.5, 1987  July 20, 1988  Nov. 7, 1988 
Length Event Window  1 day  1 day 1 day
Observations Event Window  247  247  247 
Notes: Table shows cumulative average abnormal returns from market-model OLS regressions (figures 
in brackets are t-stats based on standard errors clustered per trading day). The dependent variable is 
daily stock returns. See text for specification details (equations 7 and 8). The independent variables 
shown in the table are event dummies (de) interacted with export status (dx), and triple interactions 
between the event dummy, export status and Canadian tariff cuts (dCAN) or US tariff cuts (dUS), 
respectively. All columns use a continuous definition of export status (log sales). All specifications 
include industry fixed effects interacted with the event dummy. +, *, and ** denote statistical 




Table 11: Quantification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predicted Abnormal Returns             
-  Non-Exporters  -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 
-  Exporters  0.9% 1.1% 2.7% 0.9% 1.4% 4.7% 
Implied Profits Changes (0-100%)             
-  Non-Exporters  -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 
-  Exporters  0.9% 1.1% 2.7% 0.9% 1.4% 4.7% 
Implied Profits Changes (30-100%)        
-  Non-Exporters  -0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 
-  Exporters  1.3% 1.6% 3.9% 1.3% 2.1% 6.9% 
Implied Profits Changes (50-100%)        
-  Non-Exporters  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 3.5% 
-  Exporters  1.8% 2.3% 5.5% 1.8% 3.1%  10.2% 
Implied Profits Changes (70-100%)        
-  Non-Exporters  0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.3% 6.2% 
-  Exporters  3.2% 4.1% 9.8% 3.2% 6.2%  19.8% 





percent.  log(sales) log(sales) log(sales)
Components used in computation 














Notes: Table shows predicted average abnormal returns and implied per-period profit changes for 
exporters and non-exporters. Columns 1-3 use a binary sales-proxy for export status and columns 4-6 
use log-sales. See equations (8) and (10) for the underlying specification and Tables 3 and 4, column 2, 
for the coefficient estimates used. The implied profit changes in rows 2-5 are based on the assumptions 
about the pre-post change in the likelihood of CUSFTA’s implementation indicated in the table. See 
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